This paper makes the case that Asian countries should start preparing now for a disorderly correction of global imbalances. It points to six measures they should take: allowing their currencies to appreciate against the dollar as a way of limiting their dependence on the U.S. market; accelerating regional trade initiatives to support their export sectors; using fiscal policy to sustain domestic demand; developing their financial markets; allowing intraregional exchange rates to move to accommodate differences in the impact of the shock and the scope for offsetting action; and enhancing regional cooperation to address free-rider and firstmover problems that might otherwise discourage these adjustments.
Global imbalances and the transpaciªc imbalance between the United States and Asia in particular loom over all discussions of the need for international policy coordination. The paradox is that, to date, the inºuence of these imbalances has been benign, which has limited the perceived urgency of policy responses designed to ensure a smooth global adjustment. The United States, by running a large and persistent current account deªcit, has helped to sustain the growth of global demand. China, by running a large and growing current account surplus, has helped to sustain the growth of global supply. By providing a buoyant market for the exports of other countries, the United States has facilitated the pursuit of export-led growth. It has enabled emerging markets in East Asia and elsewhere to accumulate unprecedented stocks of international reserves. By providing an elastic supply of consumer goods, China for its part has moderated global inºationary pressures and allowed the Federal Reserve System and other central banks to maintain a relatively accommodating monetary stance. These insights are not new: the idea that global imbalances have beneªts not just for the United States, but also for the surplus countries, is at the heart of the "global codependence" and "New Bretton Woods" views of the current global conjuncture (Mann 2004; Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2003) .
All this could change, of course, in an instant. If questions arise about the sustainability of the U.S. current account deªcit and the willingness of the United States to take the steps needed to readjust its position, foreign ªnance for the U.S. deªcit could dry up abruptly. If the U.S. capital account moves toward balance, its current account will have to move toward balance as well. The curtailment of ªnancial inºows will mean a reduced demand for dollar assets. Lower asset valuations, including lower housing prices, will make U.S. households feel less wealthy. Who knows-they might even start saving again. As the demand for dollar-denominated assets is curtailed, the dollar exchange rate will depreciate, and higher import prices will fan imported inºation and, perhaps ultimately, force the U.S. Federal Reserve Board to raise policy rates further than currently anticipated.
None of this bodes well for continued economic expansion in the United States. To be sure, the more quickly a weaker dollar crowds in American exports, the more moderate any U.S. slowdown will be. But even this scenario, while relatively favorable for the United States, will not be good news for the rest of the world, since it implies a signiªcant shift in demand away from the products of other countries.
There is no single deªnitive interpretation of the transpaciªc imbalance, and a number of inºuential accounts raise doubts about the risk of a disorderly correction. But the absence of a consensus is not a justiªcation for inaction by policymakers. While there similarly may be no consensus about the likelihood of another Asian tsunami, this does not relieve policymakers of the need to prepare-and, in particular, for them to buy insurance against the possibility of the event. There is an analogous argument for preparing for the possibility of a disorderly correction of the U.S. current account.
Preparing for this possibility requires identifying how Asian economies will feel the effects of a disorderly correction. In contrast to earlier periods characterized by rising U.S. interest rates and sudden stops in capital ºows, this time it is unlikely to be ªnancial channels through which emerging Asian countries are primarily affected. Asian countries are running current account surpluses instead of deªcits and minimizing their borrowing. Stronger policies have reduced the danger of capital ºight. Governments and central banks have accumulated immense amounts of reserves in the effort to ªnancially "bulletproof" their economies. This is not to suggest that the ªnancial consequences of a disorderly correction of the U.S. deªcit will be painless. In particular, the exceptionally low interest rates on sovereign bonds and ºood of foreign money into local stock markets will not persist in this scenario, and a sharp adjustment in asset prices will not be easy to digest. Still, there is less reason for East Asia to worry about the ªnancial fallout than on prior occasions when sharp increases occurred in U.S. interest rates.
1 Note that this is quite different from the situation in, say, Latin America. Rather, the principal risk to the emerging Asian economies lies in the possibility that a disorderly correction could precipitate a major slowdown in U.S. growth and, speciªcally, in the growth of U.S. net import demand. The unavoidable consequence would be a sharp compression of U.S. and global demand. If capital inºows into the United States decline by 6.5 percent of GDP (their current level) because foreign ªnance dries up completely, then the current account must move immediately to balance, by the deªnition of the balance of payments. The result on impact would be for U.S. demand, and speciªcally U.S. net demand for imports, to decline by 6.5 percent. Assuming a world economy growing at 5 percent and a U.S. economy that accounts for a quarter of the world, this eliminates more than one-third of the normal growth in global demand. The second-round effects following this fall in production could then aggravate the impact on output and employment. This could be a major global recessionary event.
Exposure to the danger of a disorderly correction is thus greatest for countries How should Asian policymakers respond to these risks? The appropriate policy package has six components:
1. First, Asian currencies should be allowed to begin appreciating against the dollar now in order to narrow current account surpluses vis-à-vis the United States, which would reduce the region's exposure to a sudden compression in the U.S. deªcit. Movement toward greater exchange rate ºexibility now, before rebalancing pressures mount further, would minimize conªdence problems and give authorities greater monetary ºexibility, which is precisely what they need. 2. Second, progress in regional trade liberalization should be accelerated. This will limit the need to radically restructure production away from exports if U.S. demand declines and allow Asian economies to continue exploiting their comparative advantage. 3. Third, offsetting the contractionary impact on demand of currency-appreciationcum-monetary-tightening will require domestic policies of ªscal stimulus. 5 Caveats are relevant here as always. Fiscal loosening should be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis in the context of well-deªned expenditure programs that address priority areas, sound public expenditure management practices, and appropriate recognition of contingent-liability and debt sustainability issues. For example, sharp ªscal expansion in Indonesia or the Philippines is not recommended. However, maintaining an appropriate level of demand in the face of currency appreciation and monetary tightening will require some expansionary thrust from ªscal policy across the region as a whole. 4. Fourth, measures promoting ªnancial market development can help by relaxing credit constraints and reducing the incentive for high levels of precautionary saving. This will eventually work to address the region's savings-investment imbalance. Since these initiatives work over a relatively long horizon, however, they are less helpful for offsetting a disorderly correction of the transpaciªc imbalance in the scenario in which this occurs relatively soon. Indeed, focusing on such long-term measures alone may increase the risk of disruptive effects when the adjustment occurs. This perspective on ªnancial development and integration is also quite different from the conventional Asian emphasis on the desirability of deepening regional ªnancial markets in order to better "recycle Asian savings within the region." At present, capital ºows from Asia to the United States in the form of investments in U.S. Treasury securities and then back to Asia (especially China) in the form of U.S. foreign direct investment. Instead, channeling the same amount of money directly from Chinese savers to Chinese investors will not change anything relevant to the current account. In other words, the attempt to stop Asian savings from ºowing into the United States and to keep them in Asia will, by itself, have no signiªcant impact on global imbalances or the risk of a disorderly correction. 5. Fifth, there is a need for ºexibility in intra-Asian exchange rates, because the impact of the shock and the room for maneuver for policy will differ across countries. In particular, since the impact of a U.S. slowdown and the scope for compensatory policies both differ across countries, so too does the need for currency adjustments. The argument that Asian currencies will have to appreciate as a group against the dollar is valid, but it is not an argument for suppressing intraregional currency movements. Attempting to lock diverse Asian countries into a single exchange rate is a prescription for suppressing adjustment. 6. Sixth, and notwithstanding the immediately preceding point, adjustments can be undertaken more easily and will be more effective if they are coordinated across countries. Within Asia, this means reaching agreement on the desirability of stronger currencies against the dollar and on ªscal stimulus, since in both cases there are ªrst-mover and free-rider problems. Redoubling efforts to complete an Asian free trade area and cooperating on ªnancial development are also necessary. Asian countries might also negotiate an agreement on reserve transparency to facilitate the orderly diversiªcation of foreign reserves and to minimize the risk of destabilizing portfolio shifts. They should build stronger and more independent institutions of regional surveillance to facilitate the collective assessment of economic conditions, risks, and vulnerabilities.
Each of these issues deserves more discussion. However, one point must be reiterated: one does not have to believe that a disorderly correction is inevitable to justify taking steps to prepare for the possibility. For China, this means moving away from an excessive dependence on exports to the United States by modifying the macroeconomic policy mix in the direction of looser ªscal and tighter monetary policies.
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Given the difªculty of changing the composition of demand in short order and, in particular, of coordinating increases in public spending between the central and provincial governments, this means initiating the adjustment even while the transpaciªc imbalance persists. 7 Assuming the beneªts of ªscal stimulus spill across countries, especially neighboring Asian countries increasingly linked by vertical intra-industry trade and direct foreign investment, it is necessary to internalize these externalities by coordinating policy. The same argument applies to exchange rate adjustments, in regard to which individual Asian countries are understandably reluctant to move without the support of their neighbors. It also applies to accelerating the process of regional trade liberalization. The case for policy coordination is compelling. Now is the time to start moving.
